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CASE NOTES
Arbitration-Compliance With Conditions Precedent to Arbitrators' Juris-
diction To be Resolved by the Courts.-Defendant corporation contracted
with plaintiff Board of Education to perform all electrical work for a local
school construction project. The contract was made pursuant to Section 3313
of the New York Education lawl and subject to certain annexed general con-
ditions. The conditions provdded for settlement by the project architect of all
claims and disputes between the parties and all matters pertaining to the
ezecution or interpretation of the contract itself. It further provided that
there could be arbitration upon either the architect's decision or his failure
to render a decision within ten days after the parties presented their evidence.
Notice of demand for arbitration had to be made within ten days after receipt
of the architect's decision, or, if he failed to act, within a reasonable time
thereafter.
In July and August 1958, defendant invoked the contractual provision for
the architect's determination of his claims. When no decision was rendered, he
made a demand for arbitration. The Board subsequently moved for a stay,
alleging primarily that defendant had failed to comply with the notice
provisions of section 3813. Defendant contended that arbitration was not a
special proceeding within the meaning of this section,2 and further that the
1. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813 provides that no action or zpccial procccding r3y be
maintained agamst a school district or board of education unles a written verified
claim be presented to the district's governing body within three months after the accrual
of such claim.
2. In re Interocean Mercantile Corp., 204 App. Div. 224, 197 N.Y. Supp. 7cOi (let
Dep't), aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 537, 142 N.E. 295 (1923), dealt with, for the firet time, the
question of whether an agreement to negotiate, not acknowLedgCd or proved as rcquired
by N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1449, could be classified as a "spcial procceding." The court
reasoned that the arbitration provided for by the agreement was not a statutory arbitration
within N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 144S-69, and therefore was not a "spcial prccccdin.-" as
referred to in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 303. To offset this determination, NY. Civ.
Prac. Act § 1459 was enacted, which specifically provided that "arbitration of a con-
troversy under a contract or submission described in section fourteen hundred forty-cight
shall be deemed a special proceeding, of which the court ... shall have jurizdiction.'
In the instant case, however, defendant argued that a sp~dal proceeding within the
framework of § 3313 was not to be so broadly construed. Relying on the tcrminoloQy
of the section itelkf, that "no action or special proceeding ... shall be prozccuted or
maintained against any school district ...unless it shall appear by and as an alle,-ration
in the complaint or necessary moving papers that a written verified claim upon which
such action or special proceeding is founded was presented . . . ,' defendant contcndcJ
that "special proceeding" was intended to apply only to the ordinary proecution in a
court of law. Although this narrow position was espouscd by the minority, the majority
found no basis for limiting the broad language of the statute, and in light of the eLpre.3
terminology of § 1459, it would appear that the majority view is a r.acnable one.
See Harnick v. Buffalo Brake Beam-Acme Steel & Malleable Iron Works, 127 N.Y.S.
2d 303 (Sup. CL 1953), in which the court said that where parties have contracted
to submit an issue between them to arbitration, it mahes no difference as to the
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applicability of the section was to be decided by the arbitrators rather than
the court. The motion for stay of arbitration was denied by special term,
but was granted by the appellate division.3 The court of appeals affirmed, in
a four-to-three decision, holding that compliance with steps preliminary to
arbitration was properly a question to be resolved by the court, involving as
it did, a condition precedent to defendant's right to arbitration and to the
arbitrators' jurisdiction. Board of Educ. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476,
166 N.E.2d 666, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1960).
Whether or not there has been compliance with pre-arbitration procedural
matters has long been the subject of jurisdictional dispute and, at first glance,
the authorities would appear to be irreconcilable. In the instant case, the
court asserted that it was proper for a party to proceed before an arbitrator only
if he had agreed to arbitrate, and that compliance with the terms of the
arbitration agreement was necessarily a question for the court.4 In so holding,
the majority relied upon the proposition that where specific contractual pre-
arbitration provisions are ignored, the arbitration agreements themselves become
inoperative. The minority position was based on the general principle enun-
ciated in In the Matter of Paloma Frocks, Inc.,5 that the only issues to be
determined by a court on a stay application were those relating either to the
making of the contract or submission, or the failure to comply therewith. All
acts of the parties subsequent to the making of the contract, raising issues of
fact or law, rested exclusively within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. The
minority therefore concluded that the question of timeliness of a demand
for arbitration, arising as it did subsequent to the making of the arbitration
contract, was properly an issue for the arbitrators to decide.0 It would appear
jurisdiction of the supreme court whether such contract was imposed upon the parties by
statute or by voluntary act, since in either event arbitration is a special proceeding.
See also Imbrici v. Madison Ave. Realty Corp., 199 Misc. 244, 245, 99 N.Y.S.2d 762,
763 (Sup. Ct. 1950), where it was stated: "It [arbitration] is, for all purposes, a special
proceeding . . ."; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield, Ltd., 204 F.2d 366
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953), where a similar conclusion was reached in
construing the New York law.
3. Board of Educ. v. Heckler Elec. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 940, 190 NY.S.2d 942 (2d
Dep't 1959).
4. For cases decided by the courts see Boston Mut. Life Ins. v. Insurance Agents Int'l
Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1958); In the Matter of Levine Bros. Iron Works Corp.,
279 App. Div. 912, 110 N.Y.S.2d 912 (2d Dep't 1952) (memorandum decision); In the
Matter of Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 262 App. Div. 829, 28 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Ist Dep't 1941)
(memorandum decision); In the Matter of Mark Cross Co., 15 Misc. 2d 947, 181 N.Y.S.2d
110 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; In the Matter of Shine's Restaurant, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 737, 113 N.Y.S.
2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In the Matter of Ketchum & Co., 20 Misc. 2d 736, 70 N.Y.S.2d 476
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
5. 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
6. For cases decided by the arbitrators see In the Matter of Terminal Auxiliar Maritima,
6 N.Y.2d 294, 160 N.E.2d 526, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959); In the Matter of Uraga Dock
Co., 6 N.Y.2d 773, 159 N.E.2d 212, 186 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1959) (memorandum decision);
In the Matter of Paloma Frocks, Inc., supra note 5; In the Matter of Hatzel & Buehler,
Inc., 303 N.Y. 836, 104 N.E.2d 376 (1952) (memorandum decision); In the Matter of
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that the majority's conclusion is more sound. However, its initial reasoning
is subject to question.
The majority referred to prior decisions wherein the court had used broad
language to the effect that the only issues which a court may consider are the
making of the contract or the failure to comply therewith. 7 It went on to say
that this language did not mean to suggest that the arbitrators possessed "the
power to decide whether the conditions precedent to the institution of the
arbitration proceeding itself had been fulfilled."-3 The majority referred
specifically to In the Matter of Lipwan,O "where the matter of the cancella-
tion of a contract of arbitration was held to be an issue for the arbitrators
rather than the court, [and where] we expressly noted that 'a different question
would be here ... if there were any conditions precedent.' """ Taken out of
context, the implication exists that in Lipman the court was making an
exception in cases involving conditions precedent to arbitration. The converse
is true. What the court actually said was that
a different question vould be here if the issue was whether the contract never came
into existence and hence was void, or if, although the contract was made, there
arose an issue of fraud, duress or other impediment v.hich rendered the contract
voidable, or if there were any conditions precedent. But since appellant in the case
at bar admits the making of the contract ...sufficient has been shown to ma:e
applicable that part of section 1450 of the Civil Practice Act ;hich reads as follows:
"Upon being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the
contract . . . or the failure to comply therevith, the court . . . hearing such
application, shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the contract .... l
This language appears to imply that all acts of the parties subsequent to the
making of the contract which raise issues of law or fact are exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. The term conditions precedent was
obviously intended to mean conditions precedent to the very existence of a
valid contract, and rather than supporting the majority position, Lipman, in
actuality, supports the dissent. Despite this, however, it would still appear
that the majority opinion is correct.
A study of the cases decided by the courts reveals that specific time or
notice provisions were involved, which had to be satisfied before arbitration
could be commencedY The time or notice provisions were treated as conditions
Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, S6 N.E.2d 162 (1949); In the -Matter of TuSC2
Laces, Inc., 297 N.Y. 914, 79 N.E.2d 744 (194S) (memorandum deciion); In the .Mattr
of Kramek & Uchitelle, Inc., 2S N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (1942); In the Mattcr of
Lipman, 2S9 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942); In the Matttr of Tattman, 274 App. Div.
395, 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1st Dep't 1943).
7. In the Matter of Paloma Frocks, Inc., supra note 5.
S. 7 NY .2d at 431, 166 N.E.2d at 663, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
9. 239 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 317 (1942).
10. 7 N.Y.2d at 431-S2, 166 NL.E.2d at 66S, 199 N.Y.S2d at 652, in refernce to
In the Matter of Lipman, 2S9 N.Y. at 79-SO, 43 N.E.2d at 313.
11. In the Matter of Lipman, supra note 10 at 79-.0, 43 N.E.2d at 313-19.
12. See note 4 supra.
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precedent to the right of arbitration. In the cases decided by the arbitrators,0
however, specific time and notice provisions, with three exceptions,1 4 were
conspicuous by their absence. The precedents, with the exceptions noted,
concerned general disputes in no way involving conditions precedent. While
the exceptions did concern such conditions, they did not, in fact, affect the
right to arbitration.
In In the Matter of Uraga Dock Co.,13 the buyer was obligated to
make his first contract payment within ten days after deposit of specified
documents. Although the documents were delivered, the buyer failed to make
payment within the prescribed period. The court found that payment was a
condition precedent to the duty of subsequent performance by the builder.
Thus, it was not a condition precedent to the right of arbitration.
In In the Matter of Tugee Laces,16 the contract of sale provided that
claims for defective goods had to be made within ten days of delivery. After
lapse of the ten day period, defendant returned defective goods, but plaintiff
refused to accept them and brought an action to enforce arbitration. Enforce-
ment was denied by the trial court because the plaintiff, a foreign corporation,
had not been certified in New York and therefore did not qualify to maintain
an action under Section 218 of the New York General Corporation Law.11
This decision was reversed by the appellate division18 and the reversal affirmed
by the court of appeals,' 9 but the merits of the time and notice provisions
were not discussed.
In the Matter of Tuttinan29 presented a similar defective-goods provision, a
presentation after the ten day period and a refusal of acceptance. The ten day
clause was held not to constitute a statute of limitations barring arbitration,
since the language of the contract was sufficiently broad to vest the arbitration
tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction of all disputes arising subsequent to the
making of the contract. The issue of timeliness of conditions precedent to
arbitration was squarely faced and a conclusion contrary to the weight of
authority was reached. It would also appear that the authorities cited in
13. See note 6 supra.
14. In the Matter of Uraga Dock Co., 6 N.Y.2d 773, 159 N.E.2d 212, 186 N.Y.S.2d
669 (1959) (memorandum decision); In the Matter of Tugee Laces, Inc., 297 N.Y. 914, 79
N.E.2d 744 (1948) (memorandum decision); In the Matter of Tuttman, 274 App. Div. 395,
83 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1st Dep't 1948). A fourth exception, In the Matter of Hatzel & Buehler,
303 N.Y. 836, 104 N.E.2d 376 (1952) (memorandum decision), was only concerned with
the question of incQrporation by reference of a contract with arbitration conditions.
15. 6 N.Y.2d 773, 159 N.E.2d 212, 186 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1959).
16. 297 N.Y. 914, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948).
17. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 218 provides: "A foreign corporation, other than a
moneyed corporation, doing business in this state shall not maintain any action in this
state upon any contract made by it in this state, unless before the making of such
contract it shall have obtained a certificate of authority."
18. 273 App. Div. 756, 75 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't 1947).
19. 297 N.Y. 914, 79 N.E.2d 744 (1948).
20. 274 App. Div. 395, 83 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1st Dep't 1948). In connection with this caso
see In the Matter of Raphael, 274 App. Div. 625, 86 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1st Dep't 1949).
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support of this conclusion were misinterpreted. Of the two cases cited by the
court, neither contained conditions precedent to arbitration. One considered
whether or not an arbitration clause in a contract was deemed to be part of a
second contract which replaced the orignal,21 and the other dealt with a loss
of goods by fire and earthquake under a contract of purchase and sale.-" Both
cases considered only general issues of performance, and in no way touched
upon the question of conditions preliminary to arbitration. The decision thus
reached would appear to be out of context with the authorities cited. It is
submitted that the last two decisions are in keeping with public policy, but
for other reasons.2
In In the .Matter of Hatzel & Bvehler, Inc.,21 the main issue was vhether
provisions for arbitration were to be included in subcontracts through mere
reference to "general conditions" in the main contract, one of which was an
arbitration clause. After a lengthy discussion of this point the New York
Supreme Court ruled that incorporation by reference was sufficient. The
question of whether there had been compliance with the conditions under
which arbitration was to be allowed was dismissed in one cursory sentencei-
rendering this case extremely doubtful authority.
The authorities cited by the minority, therefore, would not appear to con-
flict with the rationale underlying the majority holding that compliance with
time and notice provisions precedent to arbitration is for the courts to determine.
It would seem necessary that such issues be decided by the court. These
proxisions or conditions precedent establish the very validity of arbitration.
While the parties to a contract may agree to arbitration, they also assume that
there will first be fulfillment of any preliminary steps. If the conditions remain
unfulfilled, then the agreement to arbitrate should remain ineffective.
This distinction was accurately summarized in In the Matter of Ward
Leonard Elec. Co.,eG a recent decision of the New York Supreme Court. There
it was held that:
the issues before the court on a motion to stay arbitration are limited to those which
arise as to the making of the contract and the failure to comply therev:ith.... Every
other issue whether of fact or law if it is comprised within the agreement to arbitrate
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator.... However, vhether the dis-
21. In the Matter of Lipman, 2S9 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942).
22. Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 146 N.E. 203 (1924).
23. The sellers were trying to protect themselves from poQibk liability due to defective
goods. The general law and the law of New York, in a sale of paronal propIrty, is that
a seller cannot discharge himself from liability arising from the sale of latcntly defctive
goods, although he may do so where the defects are patent, under the doctrine of "caveat
emptor." In the two cases at hand, the provisions attempted to bar all rlam after ten
days. Such provisions are without legal effect and the dccisons of the: ca-,esa are in
keeping with the rule.
24. 93 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. CL 1950), aff'd mem., 273 App. Div. 647, 103 X.Y.S2d 122
(lst Dep't 1951), aff'd mem., 303 N.Y. S36, 104 N.E.2d 376 (1952).
25. "The other objections of respondent raise issues which are for the arbitrators.' 93.
N.YS.2d at 872.
26. 12 Misc. 2d 304, 173 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. CL 195S).
1960]
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pute falls within the agreement and is, therefore, arbitrable is for the court to deter-
mine in the first instance .... 27
The position of the New York and federal law at present is that interpretation
of arbitration agreements is ordinarily for the courts. This is necessary in that
the agreement is the foundation of the arbitrators' jurisdiction and their con-
struction of it, with respect to their own powers, would not be conclusive. 28
An agreement may specifically provide that the arbitrators will decide what is
to be submitted to them, but this jurisdiction cannot be inferred.20 The weight
of authority holds that arbitrability in general, and compliance with conditions
precedent to arbitration in particular, are questions for the courts to determine,
while the question of merits is left for the arbitrators.30
Clearly, a condition precedent to the very right to arbitrate presents a
question of arbitrability rather than one of merits. In the instant case, there
was no contractual grant to the arbitrators of the right to determine their own
jurisdiction. Nor do the minority's fears that the very purpose of arbitration
will be defeated, if the courts are allowed to determine the question of arbi-
trability,3 ' appear justified. The divergent approach to the scope of authority
appeared as early as 1929 in Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co. 32 Chief
Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, emphasized that the common law did
not distinguish between the role of the court and that of the arbitrators. He
pointed out that "to limit its [arbitration's] extension is to give it efficacy and
power."3 3 Judge Crane, however, felt that arbitration should not be impeded
by the court but should be given as free a rein as possible.3 4 It is submitted
that the instant decision has reconciled these opposing views and clarified a
27. Id. at 307, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
28. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield, Ltd., 204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.
1953).
29. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; B. Fernandez
& Hnos. S. Enc. v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 119 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1941).
30. See Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938),
where failure to comply with the terms of an arbitration agreement was held to be a
waiver of, and a bar to, arbitration; Harrison v. Pullman Co., 68 F.2d 826 (8th Cir.
1934), where an employee's suit to compel arbitration was dismissed where he followed
only two of the three appeals specified in the arbitration agreement. See also International
Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957); Koscove
v. Peacock, 136 Colo. 371, 317 P.2d 332 (1957); Franklin Needle Co. v. American Fed'n
of Hosiery Workers, 99 N.H. 101, 105 A.2d 382 (1954); Sloan v. Journal Publishing Co.,
213 Ore. 324, 324 P.2d 449 (1958); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1955);
Volunteer Elec. Co-op. v. Gann, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 16537 (D.D.C. 1960). For further
discussions concerning jurisdiction over question of arbitrability, see I B.C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 114 (1960); 23 Fordham L. Rev. 352 (1954); 67 Harv. L. Rev. 510 (1954);
28 St. John's L. Rev. 47 (1953).
31. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
32. 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
33. Id. at 303, 169 N.E. at 392.
34. Id. at 307, 169 N.E. at 394 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 29
confused area of law. The limitation advocated by Chief Judge Cardozo has
been clearly defined. Matters decisive of the arbitrators' right to act shall be
determined by the courts. Resolution of all other disputes shall be left to the
arbitrators themselves.
Constitutional Law-Evidence Obtained by State Officers Via Unlawful
Seizure Inadmissible in Federal Trial.-Petitioners were indicted in a federal
district court for intercepting and divulging telephone communications and for
conspiracy to so act. Before trial, petitioners made a motion to suppress certain
tape and wire-recording evidence which had been seized originally by state law
enforcement officers. Although two Oregon courts had previously determined
that the evidence had been seized in violation of state law, the motion was
denied.' Upon trial the articles were admitted in evidence, and petitioners were
subsequently convicted. The court of appeals affirmed.2 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court, four justices dissenting, -acated the judgment and remanded
the case to the district court. Evidence obtained by state officers during a
search, which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
petitioners' immunity from unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment, is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial. The test of an unreason-
able search and seizure is one of federal law. Elkins v. Unitcd States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960).
The fourth amendment 3 was written into our federal constitution as an
antidote for the abuses inherent in general search warrants in common usage
prior to the American Revolution.4 Similar guarantees were repeated in state
constitutions.5 Although the right of an individual to be secure from unreason-
able search and seizure was guaranteed, the only remedies actually afforded an
aggrieved party were a proceeding to reacquire the evidence0 or an action at
1. "Following an appropriate motion, the Multnomah County District Court held
the search warrant invalid and ordered suppression of the evidence. This action came,
however, after the return of an indictment by a state grand jury, and the local ditrict
attorney challenged the power of the district court to supprezs evidence once an indictment
was in. Accordingly, the question was later argued anew on a motion to supprca: in the
Circuit Court for Multnomah County, a court of general criminal jurisdiction. That court
held the search unlawful and granted the motion to supprc:3. The state indictment was
subsequently dismissed2' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 2C, 207 n.1 (19).
2. Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d SS3 (9th Cir. 1959).
3. U. S. Const. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be Ecure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searchc and sizurcz shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be s.arched, and the pcr-on or
things to be seized."
4. Writs of assistance, issued by the courts to revenue offcers, empowered tho e oMccrs
with unlimited discretion to search private homes for smugglcd goods. I Cooley, Comtitu-
tional Limitations 615 (Sth ed. 1927).
S. Ibid.
6. Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seczed
Evidence, 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 60 (1941).
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law for damages. 7 This situation was created by the unvarying rule that a
court would receive competent evidence in a criminal trial without inquiring
into the way it had been procured.8 The Supreme Court deviated from the
accepted rule, however, in Boyd v. United States.9 The rule advanced in that
case remained unquestioned in the Court until Adams v. New York, 10 when the
Court reverted to its former policy."
The modern federal exclusionary rule was firmly established by the leading
case of Weeks v. United States.12 In Weeks, the Court also set fourth the
basis for the admissibility in federal courts of evidence illegally seized by state
officers, stating that fourth amendment protections were not directed toward
the conduct of such officials.' 3
In Wolf v. Colorado,14 however, the "core" of the fourth amendment was
applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 5 If that decision in any way changed the rationale behind Weeks,
its impact was not immediately reflected in the vast majority of jurisdictions
which considered the problem.' 6 The Supreme Court in particular left the
question open.' 7 It is to be noted that, in deciding the instant case, the Court
did not determine that all evidence illegally seized by state officers will be
7. Ibid. See also cases cited in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949).
8. "When papers are offered in evidence, the court can take no notice how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral Issue to
determine that question." Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841).
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court stated that the fruits of a search violative of the
fourth amendment would, when received in evidence in a criminal prosecution, violate the
privilege against self incrimination found in the fifth amendment. But see Bacon v. United
States, 97 Fed. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1899). Boyd has been criticized as being thoroughly
incorrect in its historical assertions. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search
and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 480 (1922).
10. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
11. The Court restricted Boyd to its precise facts. Id at 597. Citing with approval
Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841), the Court in effect reembraced
the common law position. Id. at 595.
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The common law rule rested on the premise that the trial
would be unnecessarily delayed by the litigation of a collateral issue.
13. Id. at 398.
14. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
15. It is to be noted that this was dictum but has been reaffirmed and is no longer
open to question. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1959); Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
16. Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) ;
Brown v. United States, 255 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); Gaitan v. United
States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937 (1958); United States v.
Benanti, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 355 U.S. 96 (1957);
United States v. White, 228 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956); Williams v. United States, 215
F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1954); Burford v. United States, 214 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1954). But
see Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
17. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957); Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
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inadmissible in a federal court, but only that evidence which has been seized in
violation of the fourth amendment.18 Consequently, illegality under state law
is not a consideration.
In applying the "core" of the fourth amendment to the states, Wolf
recognized the distinction traditionally drawn between the protection of the
first eight amendments and the protection afforded by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Not every pledge secured by the Bill of Rights
is embodied in due process,1" but only those necessary to the "concept of
ordered liberty.' 20 Because the statement in W1olf was couched in reference to
due process, it seems clear that the Court intended that the word "core" be
given a construction consonant with that traditionally accorded the concept of
due process.2 ' It would not appear that the "core" of the fourth amendment
was intended to be shorthand for the amendment itself. The language of Mr.
Justice Rutledge, in his dissent, made this apparent. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
although preferring to have the specific guarantees of the fourth amendment
embodied in the fourteenth, welcomed the fact that "the Court, in its slower
progress toward this goal, today finds the substance of the Fourth Amendment
'to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty..'. "2 The scope of the
protection afforded by each of these amendments is, therefore, not identical.
A further distinction was discernible in Wolf. While the exclusionary rule was
deemed necessary to safeguard the fourth amendment, the substance of that
amendment could be safeguarded without it.2 3 The remedies available under
each amendment, it should also be noted, are not necessarily similar.
The Court in the instant case ignored these distinctions and, in reliance upon
Wolf, seemed to say that the Constitution now requires the esclusion, in a
federal court, of all evidence secured by an unconstitutional search and
seizure.24 How Wolf supports this contention is not readily apparent. By
making the body of federal law surrounding the fourth amendment the test
to be applied to the conduct of state officerses the Court has placed an
13. 364 U.S. at 223.
19. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); Tv ining v. N'v: Jcr y, 211
US. 73, 99 (103).
20. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
21. As far bach as 1377, in Davidson v. New Orlkans, r6 U.S. 97 (I,77), it V as
recognized that the administration of justice would best be served by maling no attEmpt
to give a rigid defnition to due process, but to keep the concept viable by a priceca of
judicial inclusion and exclusion.
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 333 U.S. 25, 47 (1949). (Emphasis added.) It should be noted
that Mr. Justice Rutledge's use of "progress" anticipates the implicatikns of the inzstant
case.
23. Id. at 23-33.
24. 364 US. at 213-14.
25. "The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what onQ state court may have
countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably supprczYd." Id. at 224.
Earlier decisions, in dicta, clearly stated that the federal test was not the teft of ctate due
process, Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (194S), and that a state's procedure docz not
run afoul of the fourteenth amendment merely because to the Court's way of tbhnking
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interpretation on Wolf never intended by the Court in that decision.2 0 It has
also placed a construction on due process at odds with the traditional view of
the clause.2 7 Not every illegal state search and seizure was branded as
repugnant to the fourteenth amendment, but only those which rupture the
"core," or substance, of the fourth amendment. It would further appear that
the basic premise of the Court that "the foundation upon which the admis-
sibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally rested-that un-
reasonable state searches did not violate the Federal Constitution-thus
disappeared in 1949 ' '28 is partly erroneous. The federal exclusionary rule was
not a mandate of the fourth amendment, but rather a judicially created rule of
evidence,29 through which the courts could indirectly control the investigatory
techniques of federal officers. The dissent stressed the logical basis behind the
federal exclusionary rule, i.e., its deterrence of future unreasonable searches and
seizures.
[I]t is fanciful to assume that law-enforcing authorities of States which do not
have an exclusionary rule will to any significant degree be influenced by the potential
exclusion in federal prosecutions of evidence secured by them when state prosecu-
tions, which surely are their preoccupation, remain free to use the evidence.30
The logic behind the Weeks rule rested in the foundation of deterrence., 1
Even if it be conceded that the state search and seizure in the instant case
violated the fourth amendment, Wolf hardly furnished support for the Court's
conclusion that the evidence was therefore inadmissible. Wolf was explicit in
holding that even if a state search and seizure violated the Constitution, the
evidence secured could still be received at a state trial. 32 The procedural reme-
another method may afford better protection. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934).
26. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who authored the opinion of the Court in Wolf, dissented
in the instant case, stating: "In this use of Wolf the Court disregards . . . what precisely
was said there, namely, that only what was characterized as the 'core of the Fourth
Amendment,' not the Amendment itself, is enforceable against the States . . " 364 U.S. at
237-38. For a different interpretation of the "clear import of that statement," see
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960) (dissenting opinion). It Is significant
that, in the instant case, the Court eliminated all reference to the "core of the Fourth
Amendment," so strongly insisted upon by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Court, in citing
Wolf, stated: "'The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . .
is . . . implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause.'" Id. at 213.
27. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877).
28. 364 U.S. at 213. It is not enough to find that the "core" of the fourth amendment
is applicable to the states through the due process clause. It must further be found that
the Court has that element of control necessary to render the exclusionary rule effective
as a deterrent.
29. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949).
30. 364 U.S. at 241.
31. Id. at 217, 240.
32. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1949).
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dies available under the fourth and fourteenth amendments remained clearly
distinct. It would seem that the application of the exclusionary rule in this
context is, therefore, neither warranted nor compelled by prior constitutional
interpretations.
Recognizing that the application of the exclusionary rule in the instant case
will have little deterrent value in nonexclusionar, states, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter suggested that federal courts decline to receive illegally seized evidence
only in those instances where the state so seizing has itself adopted a rule of
exclusion.3a This, it was felt, would avoid needless conflict between state and
federal jurisdictions. Such a solution is as much an innovation as that proposed
by the majority and, therefore, subject to the same criticisms he directed to
the Court. It is without precedent, and, under either view, federal prosecutors
will be deprived of vital evidence. That there is conflict between state and
federal jurisdictions in specific areas is a natural result of our federal system
of government, but not a sound reason for overturning an evidentiary rule
otherwise unobjectionable. The dissent of 1%r. Justice Harlan, in which Justices
Clark and Whittaker concurred, 3 is strictly in accord with Wolf and, as a
consequence, is aligned with the weight of precedent. Procedural rules, of
course, are not inflexible, but any alteration should be effected in the light of
society's needs as well as those of the individual.
The broad language of the Court, seemingly unnecessary inasmuch as its
holding ultimately rested upon an application of a federal rule,25 reflects an
inexorable movement of the Court toward the absorption of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause. This progression is further demonstrated by the
language in Ohio e:x re. Eatos; v. Price,O where the view that the guarantees of
a specific amendment may be enforced with less vigor under the fourteenth
amendment was rejected.37 If the two amendments are not to be distinguished,
33. 364 U.S. at 249-50.
34. Id. at 251-52. Justices Harlan, Clark and Whittakr excepted only to Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's innovation.
35. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26, which provides, in part, that "the admiusibility of evi-Ance
and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, cccpt when an act of
Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and espzeinc "' The
Court "in the light of reason and experience" has decided that in this context fcderal law
is to be the test of admissibility.
36. 364 U.S. 263 (1960). The judgment was affirmed ex necc:iztate, by an equally
divided Court, and is, therefore, without force as precedent. It is significant that Mr. Juztice
Stewart, who authored the majority opinion in the instant case, disqualified himself
from considering the merits of Price, because his father, sitting on the Supreme Court
of Ohio, was one of the deciding judges in the case.
37. In discussing the divergence of opinion within the Court as to %,hcthcr the
fourteenth amendment makes the guarantees of the Bill of Rights generally enforceable
against the States, Mr. Justice Brennan alluded to recent unsucceszful attempts to
challenge the enforcement of individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights in state casre,
and attacked any watering-down of these rights: "In Elkins today we have rejccted such
a view of the affirmative guarantees of the Fourth Amcndment." Id. at 276.
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it appears that the exclusionary rule will ultimately be impressed upon state
courts.3s The Court, in equating the two, would make federal law the test
of a state officer's conduct. By assuming jurisdiction over such conduct, and
therefore over state courts, the Court would have the element of control
necessary to the "logic" in the application of the exclusionary rule to state
courts. It would appear that this result is inevitable.
Constitutional Law-Merchandise Held in Catalogue Store for Delivery
to Customers Not Protected From Local Taxation by Interstate Commerce
Clause.-Plaintiff corporation operated a catalogue store in Fort Madison,
Iowa, at which customers selected articles either from the corporation's general
catalogue or a skeleton stock of goods. The orders were then forwarded to
the corporation's warehouse in Illinois, from which the purchased articles were
shipped to the local store for delivery.' The customers retained an option to
reject the merchandise if dissatisfied, and if rejected, or if the goods were not
picked up within thirty days, the merchandise would be returned to the out-of-
state warehouse. An ad valorem property tax,2 similar to the assessments im-
posed on the goods of other merchants, was levied on the goods in the store. The
assessment was declared void by the trial court on the basis that the merchan-
dise was within the protected stream of interstate commerce and therefore not
properly subject to local taxation. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed. Goods
forwarded from outside the state, in response to existing orders from customers,
are not immune from local taxation as part of interstate commerce while held
at the store awaiting delivery. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of Fort Madison,
- Iowa -, 102 N.W.2d 916 (1960).
State taxation of interstate commerce exceeds constitutional limitations a
when such taxation infringes upon the regulatory authority expressly granted
Congress.4 In its attempt to resolve the question of what transactions in or
38. In an analagous situation the Court compared the effect of a federal statute with
that of the constitutional restriction. It stated that the exclusion of evidence seized In
violation of the former was logically inconsistent with the admission of evidence seized
in violation of the latter. 364 U.S. at 215. The difficulty with this argument is that It
assumes the very point in issue, i.e., what is the scope of the "core" of the fourth
amendment? This is the precise question which so sharply divides the Court.
1. The choice of where the merchandise was to be sent by the warehouse was left
to the customer. It could either be delivered directly to the purchaser or a third person,
or to the purchaser or whomever he might designate at the catalogue store subsequent
to its arrival from the warehouse. The items delivered to the store were identified with
the name or number of the individual purchaser, and were placed aside in a storage room
until obtained by the respective purchasers. Brief for Appellee, pp. 9-10.
2. The assessment equaled the average daily value of the merchandise held In the
store throughout the year. No issue was raised as to the interstate character of the
articles forwarded directly to the purchaser, nor was any tax levied upon them.
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, expressly vests Congress with power "to regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
4. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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affecting interstate commerce are legitimate subjects of state ta-:ation, the
Supreme Court has adopted numerous tests. Taxes imposed on the sale of
goods before they are brought into a state have been deemed undue burdens
upon interstate commerce, acting as barriers to the free flow of merchandise
between states.? States may not tax the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce,G nor discriminate against such commerce by providing dirct com-
mercial advantage to local business.7 Taxes on articles in the course of their
movement in interstate commerce have been similarly foreclosed;8 nor may
taxes be imposed upon persons passing through a state, or coming into it
merely for the temporary purpose of drumming up businessp However, where
property has come to rest in a state primarily to serve the owner's business
advantage, to be later disposed of as his interests dictate, such merchandise
has been declared part of the general property within the state and subject
to its taxing power.10 Conversely, where a stoppage was temporary, due to
the necessities of the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience, the
property has remained immune from local taxation. In recent decisions, the
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to go further, and has held that
where a business engaged in interstate commerce is so organized that its local
outlet functions as an integral part of its transactions, state taxes on the local
activity are valid .12
In upholding the tax in the instant case, the Iowa court based its conclusion
on two tests establishing the validity of state taxation-the goods had
ceased travelling in interstate commerce and there was sufficient local
activity to bring the interstate transaction within state power. The stoppage
was deemed more than a mere interruption in the journey to the customer.
The delivery at the retail store, the court concluded, was directly beneficial
to the plaintiff in carrying on its business, because plaintiff had created a local
outlet expressly for the solicitation of orders and had received protection from
the state while operating its store.' 3 But while the court relied on the main-
tenance of a local store in applying the theory that the goods had stopped
travelling in interstate commerce, it confused the theory of cessation of transit
with recent Supreme Court pronouncements relating to local activity.
While it might be argued that the merchandise in question remained in
5. E.g., Robbins v. Sheiby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S, 4,) (1,037).
6. Spector Motor Sev., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
7. Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 339 (1952).
S. Case of State Freight Tax, S2 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1372).
9. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 4S9, 493-94 (1137).
10. E.g., Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933) (cattle awaiting fhipmcnt to un-
determined destination in another state).
11. E.g., Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 4G9 (1926) (Iogn awaiting
loading aboard ship).
12. AIcGoldrick v. Bervind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (oparation of local aTC3
office sufficient to sustain sales tax); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revcnue, 303 U.S.
250 (1933) (printing and publishing of magazine advertising distinct from its interstate
circulation).
13. - Iowa at -, 102 N.W.2d at 916, 919, 920 (1960).
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interstate commerce only up to the point of delivery to plaintiff's local store,
it is not apparent from the instant decision whether the court considered the
transit to have been actually terminated by such delivery. Nowhere did the
court expressly mention that the shipment had come to an end. Rather, it
spoke in terms of a "break in interstate transportation"'14 and "goods being at
rest."' 5 'Under the cessation of transit theory, it would appear that the mere
holding of goods awaiting delivery to a purchaser has not been sufficient to
justify a state tax.16 The benefit accruing to the owner from the discontinuance
had to be direct, not a mere stoppage due to the necessities of the journey.17
While cessation in the instant case was necessary to the interstate sale, it was
merely incidental to a final distribution of the goods. Under the Supreme Court
decisions applying the cessation theory something more had always been neces-
sary. When goods had been stored for an indefinite period, and the owner
could subsequently channel the goods where he wished, the benefit was held
direct.' 8 Where the purpose of the break in transit was to process the goods,10
or to change their original form,20 the goods were held subject to state taxation.
The question has always been one of substance. In each case it has been neces-
sary to consider the particular occasion or purpose of the interruption. It
seems clear that the facts of the instant case have never before, in themselves,
been sufficient to justify a tax on the theory that the goods had ceased their
interstate travel. The only benefit here attributed to plaintiff was the main-
tenance of a local retail outlet conveniently centered in the business district,
easily accessible to prospective customers.
However questionable the decision might be on this theory, the result reached
can nevertheless be validated on the basis that plaintiff was engaged in
sufficient local activity to warrant the imposition of a tax. This view is more
in line with recent Supreme Court decisions indicating that interstate com-
merce can be taxed if the excise is conditioned on the carrying on of local
business,2 ' while such taxes will be invalid if applied to a business exclusively
interstate in character without sufficient local activity.22 These principles were
14. Id. at -, 102 N.W.2d at 919.
15. Id. at -, 102 N.W.2d at 919, 923-24.
16. See Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929) (oil stored in tanks on dock
pending foreign shipment).
17. Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922). See also Kelley
v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
18. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947). A shipment of coal
had come to rest but without any definite order. The fact that most of the coal would
eventually be shipped to other states was found to be irrelevant.
19. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913).
20. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). This case was subsequently limited
by Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929), where continuity of journey was
liberally construed by the Court.
21. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (net
income tax on portion of foreign corporation's income earned from local business held
reasonable); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (operation of sales
office sufficient to sustain sales tax).
22. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (tax on franchise
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recently reiterated in Norton Co. v. Department of Re'cnie.P  There the
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of local activity and upheld a tax based on
orders made to a foreign corporation. A Massachusetts mail-order firm operated
a local store in Illinois at which direct sales to customers were made from
merchandise in stock. Orders were also solicited on the basis of display samples
and catalogues. As to the latter type of transactions, some of the goods were
sent directly to the purchasers from Massachusetts while others were forwarded
to the local agency for delivery to the purchaser. The majority found that the
goods sent directly to the purchaser were not subject to an Illinois tax because
the transactions were clearly interstate in character, but the goods involved in
the other type of transactions were taxable.2c1 The issue of whether the goods
had come to rest in the taxing state was not discussed. Rather, the Court
relied upon a general proposition that the local activity was sufficient to
bring the sales under state taxation. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the
majority, stated: "Petitioner elected to localize itself in the Illinois market with
the advantages of a retail outlet in the State, to keep close to the trade, to
supply locally many items and take orders for others, and to reduce freight
costs to local consumers." 25 The local agency was found to be decisive in hold-
ing the market. However, both interstate and intrastate sales were intertwined
in Norton, and it would seem logical to conclude, because of the language of
the Cour 20 and a past Supreme Court determination in an analagous situa-
tion,27 that the conduct of the local sales was the decisive reason for the
holding.23 The Supreme Court has since extended this decision. Two state
courts have likewise expressed approval of the general holding in Norton,
applying that doctrine to situations which did not embrace local sales. In
doing business exclusively interstate invalid); McLcod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327
(1944) (solicitation of orders without sales office or branch plant inufficicnt local activity
to sustain tax).
23. 340 US. 534 (1951) (five-to-four decision).
24. However, Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, advanced the theory that the local activity
was sufficient to bring those goods sent directly from the Maschet vendor to the
Illinois vendee within the scope of a state tax. He felt that the majority fhould not dis-
tinguish between goods forwarded directly to the purchaser and thoZe delivered through
the lo~al agency. Id at 541. Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in part, found that even when
the local store acted as an intermediary and delivered the goods, the tranactior, wcre in
interstate commerce and therefore immune from state taxation. Id. at 539.
25. Id. at 53S-39.
26. "This corporation has so mingled taxable business with that which it contends is not
taxable that it requires administrative and judicial judgment to separate the two ....
[Alttributing to the Chicago branch income from all sales that utilized it either in re-
ceiving the orders or distributing the goods was within the realm of p~rmizzIble judgment.
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. at 53S.
27. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1913). The Court held that the
local office and the display samples used in soliciting and tahiing orders were C:-cntil to
the furtherance of the company's interstate business. "[Tlhey are among the means by
which that business is carried on and share its immunity from state taxation." Id, at 153.
It should be noted, however, that the goods in Chency were cent directly to the purchaser.
2S. See Strecker, "Local Incidents" of Interstate Busine-s, 13 Ohio St. LJ. 69, 74 (1957).
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Field Enterprises, Inc. v. Washington,29 the Supreme Court approved a license
tax on a foreign corporation operating a local agency, but conducting no local
sales. The Court cited Norton as binding. Indiana sustained a personal
property tax on goods stored in a foreign corporation's warehouse,8 0 and New
York upheld a general business and financial tax on a foreign corporation which
operated only a local agency to facilitate business.3 1 It seems reasonable that
Norton, as interpreted by the courts, would also apply to situations involving
only interstate sales.
The local activity in the principal decision clearly fits within the pattern
established by the Norton and Field decisions. It seems apparent that where
there are local contacts or activities wthin a state, the courts will find a reason-
able relation between the taxed transaction and the taxing state. Local authori-
ties may validly tax the privilege of doing business, if the business operations,
though related to the interstate movement of goods, include local incidents
sufficient to bring the transaction within the state's jurisdiction. If this be
correct, then the many definitions of interstate commerce heretofore formulated
are no longer applicable. Sufficient local business within the state will validate a
tax though the transaction itself be interstate in character.
Eminent Domain-Use of Balance of Convenience Doctrine To Deny Part
of an Injunction.-Plaintiff, an incorporated village in Ohio, purchased
twenty-three acres of land on June 25, 1956, to be used for municipal build-
ings, park grounds, and recreational facilities. On November 4, 1958, the
village voters approved the issuance of $175,000 in bonds to finance the
construction of municipal buildings. Defendant, the Board of County Com-
missioners, filed an action on January 30, 1957, to appropriate 123 acres of
land for county airport purposes. This land included the twenty-three acres
purchased by the plaintiff on June 25, 1956. In an action by the plaintiff to
enjoin the appropriation, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court. The defendant was enjoined from appropriating that part of
the twenty-three acres necessary for the construction of municipal buildings but
was allowed to appropriate the part to be used for park and recreational
purposes. Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, - Ohio
App. -, 166 N.E.2d 143 (1960).
The right of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty vested
solely in the legislature' and related only to property necessary for a public
29. 352 U.S. 806 (1956) (per curiam), affirming 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955).
30. Arthur Walter Seed Co. v. McClure, 236 Ind. 666, 141 N.E.2d 847 (1957).
31. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates v. City of New York, S N.Y.2d 347, 157 N.E.2d
614, 184 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959).
1. City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912). See generally 1
Lewis, Eminent Domain § 3 (3d ed. 1909), and cases cited in nn.12 & 13, Contra, Todd
v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78 (1867), where it is stated in a concurring opinion that "the right
.. of eminent domain, is a reserved right. . . ." Id. at 88.
[Vol. 29
1960] CASE NOTES
use.2 The exercise of the power may be delegated by the legislatures though
statutes delegating it will be strictly construed.4 Although no impediment exists
to the taking of land privately owned, property already devoted to a public
use cannot be taken for another public use which will destroy or materially
interfere with the existing use, unless the right to do so has been conferred
by statute either expressly or by necessary implication.0 It is immaterial whether
the property was acquired by condemnation or purchase.0
In the instant case, both plaintiff7 and defendant s had statutory authority
to appropriate property. They did not have coequal rights to the twenty-three
acres in question, however, because the plaintiff had previously purchased the
property and had devoted it to a public use. Consequently, to establish a right
in the defendant to any part of the twenty-three acres, it was incumbent upon
2. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924). Sce generally 2 LcwicL, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 411.
3. Fulton Ferry & Bridge Co. v. Blackwood, 173 Ark. 645, 293 S.W. 2 (1927)
(dictum); People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, 243 N.Y. 215, 162 N.E. 10 (1923).
4. United States v. Rauers, 70 Fed. 74S (S.D. Ga. 1.93); Ontario Knitting Co. v.
State, 205 N.Y. 409, 93 N.E. 009 (1912); Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 104 Ohio SL 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922). But see Grcenwocd County v. Wat-
kins, 195 S.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 545 (1940), citing Lcitzsey v. Columbia W7atcr Power
Co, 47 S.C. 464, 479, 25 S.E. 744, 749 (1S96), which stated that strict construction is not
applied as stringently to public bodies as it is in construing powers given to private
corporations.
5. Adirondack Ry. v. New York, 176 US. 335 (1900); City of Norton v. Lowdcn, 34
F.2d 663 (loth Cir. 1936); Board of Educ. v. Proprietors of Aron Rural Cemetery, 110
Ohio St. 430, 144 N.E. 113 (1924); Vermont Hydro-Elce. Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112
Adt. 223 (1921). But see United States v. Sixty Acres, 23 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ill 1939)
(rule inapplicable where the power is exercised by the sovCreign); Pacific Po'stal Tel. Co.
v. Oregon & C.R.R., 163 Fed. 967 (C.C.D. Ore. IS03) (rule inapplicable where the
second use is not inconsistent with the existing use); State Highway Comm'n v. City of
Elizabeth, 102 Nj. Eq. 221, 140 At. 335 (192S) (rule inapplicable where the pawer L
enercised by the sovereign). The existence of power to appropriate by necc:sary implication
is a question of legislative intent which is arrived at by applying the enactment to its
subject matter, Vermont H ydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, supra, or from a ztate of facts
showing such taking to be necessary for a beneficial cnjoyment of the ribts grantcd,
Rutland-Canadian R.R. v. Central Vt. Ry., 72 Vt. 123, 47 Ad. 399 (%''h). Where the
only property available for an expressly authorized public work has already been de-
voted to a public use, the power to appropriate exits by nece:csary implication. Sce
Pittsburgh, FL W. &> C. Ry. v. Sanitary Dist., 213 IIl. 2.6, 75 N.E. 092 (105); 01 d
Colony R.R. v. Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass. 561, 27 N.E. 662 (1291). 2LA to te
requisite degree of necessity, compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvanh .R, 123
Fed. 33 (3d Cir. 1903), and Vermont Hydro-Elec. Corp. v. Dunn, cupra, with Dznvcr
Power & Irr. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 30 Colo. 204, 69 Pac. 563 (1902) (dictum), and
Butte, Anaconda & P. Ry. v. Montana Union Ry., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232 (1095). Sea
generally 2 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 1, § 440.
6. New Haven Water Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 72 Conn. 293, 44 Ad. 235 (1,M9);
In the Matter of Saratoga Ave., 226' N.Y. 128, 123 N.E. 197 (1919).
7. Ohio Re,. Code Ann. §§ 717.01(A),(B),(N),(S); 719.01(B),(C),(L) (Page 1953).
S. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 307.20, 717.01(.), 719.01(0) (Page 1953).
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the court to find a grant by the state legislature.0  The problem was one of
statutory construction. Instead, the court found a right in the defendant through
a balance of the conveniences, reasoning that injunctive relief is addressed to
the discretion of the court. Although it is generally true that injunctive relief
lies in the discretion of the court based on all the circumstances of the par-
ticular case,10 it is not discretionary when questions of law are presented."
In the present case, since the municipal corporations could exercise the right
of eminent domain only if the legislature had delegated such power, 12 the
question before the court was solely a question of law, i.e., did the defendant
possess statutory authority to appropriate land already devoted to a public
use.13 Therefore, the court's determination in favor of the defendant, in the
absence of a finding that the land held by plaintiff was not devoted to a public
use, or that plaintiff had abused its discretion, or that the defendant had the
power by necessary implication, was an invasion of a legislative function. 14
The majority, while ostensibly recognizing the doctrine of prior use and its
exceptions, would swallow the rule in its entirety by applying the equitable
doctrine.10 Though no unfavorable decision has resulted in this case, 10 the
9. - Ohio App. at -, 166 N.E.2d at 153, where Judge Guernsey, concurring, stated:
"Had the majority . . . concluded that a legislative grant of the power to appropriate
property for the operation of an airport, implies, by reason of the nature of an airport,
the right ... to appropriate all land . . . reasonably necessary to such operation, whether
or not first devoted to another public use, I might have found more common ground for
agreement."
10. Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229 (1929). See 1 High, Injunctions § 11 (4th
ed. 1905).
11. Kilburn v. Childers, 86 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), citing Tyree v. Road
Dist. No. 5, 199 S.W. 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
12. Oklahoma City v. Local Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 192 Okla. 188, 134 P.2d 565
(1943). The court stated that the power of eminent domain is dormant in the absence
of some form of legislation. A fortiori, for a municipal corporation to exercise such
power, it must he delegated by the legislature.
13. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Incorporated Town of Lost Nation, 237 Fed. 709, 713
(S.D. Iowa 1916), where the court, in determining whether the municipality had power
to condemn property already devoted to a public use, stated that "if this case involved
a question of equities between the parties, we might well consider the conduct of the
railway. . . .But it is not a question of equities; it is a question of legal rights." The
court granted an injunction enjoining the municipality from condemning the property.
14. - Ohio App. at -, 166 N.E.2d at 154 (1960), where Judge Guernsey, con-
curring, stated that this "results in the party seeking appropriation being granted on
equitable principles alone, the right to continue an action to appropriate property which
right is not bestowed on such party by the Constitution or laws of Ohio." Cf. Butler v.
Wilson, 237 Ala. 312, 186 So. 687 (1939), stating that an equity court may not create
new substantive rights under the guise of doing equity.
15. See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); United States v. 1096.84 Acres,
99 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Emery v. City of Toledo, 121 Ohio St. 257, 167 N.E.
889 (1929) ; Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 144 N.E. 132 (1924). Contra,
Township of Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 120 A.2d 593 (1956), which said
that when the doctrine of prior use comes into play, the question is for the courts.
use of the equitable approach in other cases could have the same effect as a
literal application of each grant of a general power of condemnation.' 7 In a
situation where B has appropriated property for a municipal parking lot and A
desires the same property for a county hospital, a court of equity, balancing
the conveniences, could allow condemner A to take from B. Subsequently, it
could develop that B needs the property to expand its municipal airport.
Following the reasoning of the instant case, unless A could show a greater
need, a court of equity would balance the conveniences and allow B to retake
from A.'s Recurring litigation concerning the same property could result.
Further, a small political subdivision holding property for the use of its people
could be subjected to constant condemnation proceedings by a larger political
subdivision lacking statutory authority, unless the former could show a greater
need. To avoid appropriation without statutory authority, and to avoid in-
equity and endless litigation, equitable principles should not be invoked in
this purely statutory field.
Evidence-Admissions Made After Indictment in Absence of Counsel Not
Admissible.-Police were summoned to the scene of a homicide where they
encountered the defendant. He was questioned and then released, with a warn-
ing to remain available. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted for murder,
but could not be found. After seven years absence he surrendered, by arrange-
ment of his attorney, to answer the indictment. His attorney then departed,
whereupon defendant, in response to questions, made statements which were
damaging admissions as to motive, flight from arrest and general untruth-
fulness.' At the trial, these statements were admitted in evidence over the
16. - Ohio App. at -, 166 N.E.2d at 157, where it was stated that while the propzrty
was declared to be held for a public use, it was not in fact devoted to a prior public us2.
Consequently, that portion of the property is not within the reason or opzration of the
doctrine of prior use. See In the Matter of Rochester, H. & LR.R., 110 N.Y. 119, 17
N.E. 673 (18S) (doctrine of prior use inapplicable). In Cincinnati, S. & C.R.R. v. Village
of Belle Centre, 43 Ohio St. 273, 27 N.E. 464 (1891), the court held that proplarty not usCd
or necessary for a public purpose, whether acquired by purchase or appropriation, vaix
outside the protection of the doctrine of prior use. See Vermont Hydro-Ec. Corp. v.
Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 112 Atl. 223 (1921), for a test to determine if proparty is in fact
devoted to a public use.
17. See Viliage of Ridgewood v. Borough of Glen Rock, 15 N.J. Misc. 65, 103 At. 653
(1936). See generally Ball, Intergovernmental Conflicts in Land Acquiition: Adjustment
for Maximum Public Benefit, 10 Ohio St. LJ. 30, 33 (1949).
1S. - Ohio App. at -, 166 N.E2d at 151. Although the court purported to rejeet
the doctrine that equity will compare and weigh the more paramount nccezity of the
conflicting appropriations, it nonetheless relied on necessity to balance the convwniencez.
1. The defendant admitted, inter alia, that he previously had a mizunderztanding with
the deceased, that he was at the scene of the crime and saw the victim, and that he did not
attend the wake or funeral of the deceased. He also admitted flight when he learned
the police were looking for him. The majority considered the admlzions damaging.- ince
they provided a possible motive for the billing and corroborated the promcution's claim of
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defendant's objection. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.
The New York Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting, reversed. The
interrogation of defendant in the absence of counsel, after his voluntary
surrender to be arraigned upon the indictment, was a violation of his con-
stitutional rights, and the admission in evidence of these statements was
reversible error. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.
S.2d 21 (1960).
As a general rule, statements in the nature of confessions or admissions are
admissible in New York2 in a criminal prosecution even though they are
illegally obtained.3 Traditionally, there have been only two bases for exclusion
of evidence of this type. A coerced confession is not admitted in evidence 4 on
the theory that it is untrustworthy.5 There is also a category of coerced
testimony in New York referred to as "testimonial compulsion,"0 in which the
coercion is a restricted concept in that "force is not the test, but rather force
accompanied by process aimed against a witness and compelling action on
his part.' I The cases of "testimonial compulsion" have involved situations
where a suspected witness, under oath, has been forced to testify against
himself in a preliminary hearing or inquest. The courts have found such to be
a violation of the constitutional right against self incrimination and have
ruled that the evidence must be excluded from the subsequent trial of the
witness.8
The Supreme Court of the United States has generally refrained from
flight. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21,
24-25 (1960).
2. In determining admissibility, confessions and admissions are treated alike In the
construction of N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395. See People v. Giola, 286 App. Div. 528, 145
N.Y.S.2d 495 (1st Dep't 1955).
3. People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 194-95, 192 N.E. 289, 290 (1934); People v. Mummiani,
258 N.Y. 394, 397-98, 180 N.E. 94, 95 (1932).
4. Whenever the issue of voluntariness presents a fair question of fact, New York
leaves the issue with the jury, under instructions to disregard the confession if they find
it to be involuntary. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 172 (1953); People v. Weiner, 248
N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441 (1928).
5. "It is because it is in its nature unreliable, and not on account of any impropriety In
the manner of obtaining it, that the evidence is excluded. In this all authorities agree."
People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384, 386 (1857). This is the reason why facts obtained from
facts disclosed in an involuntary confession are not themselves inadmissible. Ibid. The
exclusionary policy has been codified in N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395: "A confession of a
defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be
given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by
threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he shall not be
prosecuted therefor; but is not sufficient to warrant his conviction, without additional
proof that the crime charged has been committed."
6. People v. McMahon, supra note 5.
7. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E. 585, 590, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926).
8. People v. Mondon, 103 N.Y. 211, 8 N.E. 496 (1886). Cf. Teachout v. People, 41
N.Y. 7 (1869); People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384 (1857).
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interfering with state rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal
actions, and has refused to impose on the states the strict federal rules
regarding the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained. The significant ex-
ception to the noninterference policy has occurred in cases of confestions
obtained in violation of due process. Brown v. Mlississippi,0 involving a con-
fession extracted by physical torture, was the first case of this type to reach
the Supreme Court. In upsetting the conviction, 1 the Court held that a
confession obtained without a minimum standard of fairness was violative of
due process and inadmissible in evidence regardless of its truth or falsity.
Subsequent cases have extended the concept of due process to situations where
means other than physical coercion are used to obtain the confession. In
Watts v. Idiana,-' the Court found that the interrogation of the accused for
six nights amounted to force. And where an accused was kept incommunicado
for three days, with little food and in fear of mob violence, the confession was
held to have been obtained in xiolation of due process. 13 Crooher v. Cah-forniad"
is the only case in which there has been a majority holding by the Supreme
Court on the question of whether a confession made in absence of counsel is
inadmissible because violative of due process.'5 In that case, a confezsion had
been obtained from a suspect while he was under arrest and after his request
for counsel had been denied. In affirming the conviction, the Court found that
under the circumstances no violation had been shown.' 0
9. The federal rule excludes any evidence obtained illegally. Thus, a confcz-ion obLained
during an illegal detention is not admissible. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1943); McNabb v. United States, 313
U.S. 332 (1943). In Wolf v. Colorado, 33S, U.S. 25 (1949), however, the Supreme Court
held that evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure could be uEed at the trial of a
defendant in a state court.
10. 297 U.S. 273 (1936).
11. The Supreme Court can reverse a conviction in a state court where a confc::ion
is submitted to a jury, if it finds on the undisputed facts that the confcz:ion, as a matter
of law, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Payne v. ArLn-a-s,
356 U.S. 560 (1953); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 3S3 (1953) (dictum); Watts v.
Indiana, 333 U.S. 49 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
12. 33& U.S. 49 (1949).
13. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1953).
14. 357 U.S. 433 (1953) (five-to-four decision).
15. The concurring opinions in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 326 (1959),
however, were concerned with the right to counsel during interrogation by the p@lice.
See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
16. The Court considered the fact that the defendant was an intelligent pzrzon v~ho had
shown during questioning an awareness of his rights. Four Juzticcs diznted, saying that
the federal rule should be applied to the states in capital cases. This rule rigdly applie
the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. CO, 76 (1942), wherein
the Court stated: "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial." Cf. State v. Murphy, 37 N.J.L. 515, 530, 94 AtL 640, 646 (1915),
where the court said: "It is to be observed that the constitution doe3 not provide that
the defendant shall have the right to ...counsel from the time of his arrezt, but for his
1960]
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While the advent of the due process test has imposed an additional area
of inquiry on the state courts,17 the requirement apparently has had no effect
on any holding in New York prior to the instant case. The dissent in the
recent case of People v. Spano,'5 however, indicated that at least three New York
Court of Appeals judges were prepared to apply due process rigidly. 10 In that
case, the defendant, a somewhat uneducated immigrant with a history of
mental instability, surrendered with an attorney to a bench warrant issued upon
an indictment for murder. Instead of immediate arraignment, he was questioned
persistently during the night by the police, who denied his repeated requests
for counsel. He was also urged to confess by a policeman, a friend pretending
to be in trouble with his superiors. As a result, he made a confession which
was admitted in evidence at his trial. The conviction was affirmed on the
ground the jury had a sufficient basis to find that the confession was made
without coercion.20 The dissent, however, argued that the indictment com-
menced the legal proceedings against the accused and therefore the time for
police investigation had terminated. Consequently, the confession extracted
from the defendant after the indictment amounted to "testimonial com-
pulsion." The dissent also asserted that the denial of defendant's request for
counsel was a violation of his right to counsel under due process. A majority
of the Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction,21 held that the confession
was obtained in violation of the traditional principles of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and therefore found it unnecessary to rule on the right-to-counsel aspect
defence. Obviously, the word defence, as here used, means that a defendant is entitled to
be represented and defended by counsel when put in jeopardy on his trial, and that his
counsel shall have reasonable access to the prisoner for the purpose of preparing his defence.
• . . By no stretch of the imagination can the provision be construed to mean that one
accused of crime shall have the benefit of counsel to advise him as to whether or not he
shall confess. Confession is a thing entirely apart from defence upon a trial."
17. Previously in New York, the test of admissibility of statements in the nature of
confessions or admissions was based on voluntariness alone. See note 5 supra and
accompanying text. "The test of admissibility has been, until now, voluntariness." People
v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 552, 166 N.E.2d 825, 829, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 27 (1960) (dissenting
opinion). See People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 363, 98 N.E.2d 553, 558 (1951), where the
court recognized the necessity for the application of the due process test but nevertheless
held "this interview ... was tantamount to a form of mental coercion." See also Comment,
27 Fordham L. Rev. 396, 402-03 (1958).
18. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 264, 150 N.E.2d 226, 231, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 800 (1958), rev'd, 360
U.S. 315 (1959). See Note, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 435 (1958).
19. In the instant case, the majority consisted of the three dissenting judges in People
v. Spano (Desmond, C.J., Van Voorhis and Fuld, J.J.), in addition to a fourth judge
(Foster, J.) appointed since then. There was a concurring opinion by Judge Fuld who said,
without citing authority, that since defendant surrendered voluntarily to be arraigned on
the indictment, the fact that he made no request for counsel or objection to being
questioned was of no importance. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 551, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d
21, 26 (1960).
20. The court found no denial of defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 4 N.Y.2d
at 264, 150 N.E.2d at 230, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (1958).
21. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
of the case.2 In two concurring opinions,2 3 however, four Justices contended
that the denial of counsel alone, under these circumstances, was enough to
require a reversal.
In the principal case, the court, reversing the conviction, relied chiefly on
the concurring opinions in Spano v. New York. The court held that defendant's
right to counsel at this stage of the criminal proceeding was absolute and that
the admissions obtained by questioning in absence of counsel violated due
process. In holding that the admissions were inadmissible in evidence, the
majority referred to them as "testimonial compulsion," taling up the con-
tention of the dissenting judges in People v. Spanw. The instant dissent argued
that there was no denial of due process and that the admissions, since volun-
tary, were properly admitted in evidence at the trial.
The instant decision represents a distinct step beyond prior cases . 1 The
Supreme Court has traditionally excluded confessions because of the presence
of the element of coercion in one form or another.2 In the sole case in which
exclusion of a confession was sought by reason of denial of counsel under due
process, the Court held adversely to petitioner and affirmed the conviction. 2
The majority justified its holding on the basis of the concurring opinions
in Spano v. New York. But that case involved different facts, the most
significant of which is that the defendant made repeated requests for counsel.
The concurring Justices, although they broadly stated that the indictment of
the accused commenced the legal proceedings and gave him an absolute right
to counsel, had these particular facts in mind.27 The basic similarity between
22. Id. at 323-24.
23. Id. at 324, 326.
24. The court held that defendant had an absolute right to counsel under the
circumstances of the case. Traditionally, the concept of due prow-73 required an inveziition
of all the facts and circumstances in the case. In Powell v. Albama, 237 U.S. 45 (1932),
the Supreme Court considered the age, experience, background, mental alcrtne:3 and the
hostile atmosphere surrounding the defendants' incarceration, before deczding that the
absence of counsel amounted to a denial of due process. The defendant, in Avery v.
Alabama, 30S U.S. 444 (1940), had counsel appointed only three days before trial. The
denial of a motion for a continuance was upheld by the Supreme Court v:hich examined
the circumstances and concluded that three days was sufficient time for preparation. See
notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1953); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (use of stomach pump to secure evidence of narcoticz); Watts v. Indiana, 333
U.S. 49 (1949); Maley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1943) (fifteen-year-old boy questioned in re-
lays for five hours) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (incommunicado for thirty-
six hours; questioned in relays without rest). See also Comment, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 395
(195S).
26. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (195S), where the defendant was not under
indictment. The majority, inter alia, conceded that a circumstance, such as denial of
request for counsel could show a violation of due proccis in procuring a confesion. Ths
dictum may well have opened the door for the instant decision.
27. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, said that "the question is xvhether after the
indictment and before the trial the Government can interrogate the accusd in !::rct w~hen
he asked for his lawyer and when his request xas denied." Spano v. New Yorl, 3t0 US.
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the instant decision and Spano v. New York is that in both cases the defend-
ants voluntarily surrendered to an indictment through counsel. Although the
majority here did not amplify its conclusion that the defendant's right to
counsel was violated, the reasoning of the dissent in People v. Spano28 and of
the concurring opinions in Spano v. New York 2 indicate that the holding here
is predicated upon the desire of the court to afford an accused the procedural
safeguards which follow upon an arraignment.30 Since an indictment is based
upon a finding of probable cause which supports a belief that defendant
committed the crime,3' he deserves to be in the custody of the court and is
entitled to initiate his defense unhampered by police interrogation. For this
reason, it is apparent that the decision does not extend to an individual who
is simply under arrest without an indictment.
Although a reversal in the instant case could have been predicated solely on
a due process violation, the majority, by stating that the admissions consti-
tuted "testimonial compulsion," have also extended the meaning of that
term beyond its previous limits. Two of the three cases cited by the court for
its finding involved sworn testimony by a witness under constraint of legal
process.3 2 In the third, 33 the court affirmed the conviction, finding that there
was no "testimonial compulsion."
Both in its interpretation of due process and extension of "testimonial
compulsion," the instant decision represents new law in New York. It is the
first decision to exclude admissions of this type from evidence other than on
the basis of voluntariness. The result of the majority holding will be an effective
curtailment of any questioning of an accused by authorities once there has been
315, 325 (1959). In the second concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart said, "What
followed the petitioner's surrender in this case was not arraignment in a court of law,
but an all-night inquisition in a prosecutor's office .... [T]he petitioner repeatedly asked
to be allowed to send for his lawyer, and his requests were repeatedly denied." Id. at 327.
28. "Before a magistrate or a coroner or other judicial officer a defendant may under
no circumstances be forced to make admissions of his guilt. . . .Yet the same defendant
in the same criminal cause held under the process of the same court, can (it is now decided)
be subjected to secret midnight questioning out of reach of any lawyer, till he confesses."
4 N.Y.2d at 266, 150 N.E.2d at 232, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (1958).
29. "This representation by counsel is not restricted to the trial. As stated in Powell v.
Alabama [287 U.S. 45 (1932)] . . . 'during perhaps the most critical period of the proceed-
ings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the
beginning of their trial . . . they were as much entitled to [counsel] . . . during that
period as at the trial itself.'" 360 U.S. at 325 (1958).
30. At the arraignment an accused must be informed of his right to counsel, N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 308, and of his right not to testify against himself, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §
196. Thereupon, he is taken from police custody and placed in the custody of tho court.
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 208-09.
31. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 275. See also Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 85
(1904).
32. People ex rel. Kenney v. Adams, 292 N.Y. 65, 54 N.E.2d 10 (1944); People ex rel.
Ferguson v. Reardon, 197 N.Y. 236, 90 N.E. 829 (1910).
33. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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an indictment.34 Any confession or admission obtained in absence of counsel
will no longer be admissible over objection of defendant, regardless of any
lack of coercion.
Labor Law-Unlawful Intent of Informational Picketing Not To Be In-
ferred Solely From Prior Union Objectives.-Appellants picketed the Stork
Club continuously from January 1957, until January 1960, protesting the
discharge of several employees and protesting the Club's refusal to recognize or
bargain with the unions. Both the Club and the picketing unions sought
relief in the New York State courts and before the New York State Labor
Relations Board. The New York proceedings continued until January 1959,
when, because of federal pre-emption, the State Board dismissed both the
unfair labor practice charges brought by the unions and the Club's petition for
an election.' In January 1960, the Club filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board, alleging that the unions were engaged in unfair labor
practices under the recently enacted Section S(b) (7) (C) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 2 At the time the charges were filed, recognition and bargaining were
admitted objectives of the picketing. Soon after the filing, however, the unions
announced a change in their picketing objectives and made appropriate
changes in their picket signs. At the instance of the National Labor Relations
Board, a temporary injunction was subsequently granted by the district court.3
The court found that the Regional Director had reasonable cause to believe that
the picketing was for recognitional and bargaining purposes, and also that an
effect of the picketing was to dissuade employees of other employers from
servicing the Club. On appeal, the circuit court modified the injunction, find-
ing no "substantial independent evidence" to indicate that the picketing
continued to be for unlawful purposes. The court upheld the injunction so
far as it was based upon the refusal of neutral employees to service the Club,
but modified it to restrain the picketing during only those hours in which de-
liveries would be expected. McLeod v. Clefs Union, 2SO0 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.
1960).
34. Although the decision in the instant case involved a voluntary !-urrcndcr through
counsel, the indictment was the deciding element against the defendant. Therefore, the
same protection should be extended, whether a defendant surrender, voluntarily or through
counseL
1. The unions were then precluded from preferring charges before the National Labor
Relations Board in xiew of the proviions of § 10(b) of the Labor ManagCmCnt
Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1953) (commonly called the
Taft-Hartley Act), which pro-vides, in part, that "no complaint shall izue bas-d upon
any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing.., with the
Board ......
2. This section was added to the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
141 (1955), by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclozure Act of 1959, § 7MI(c),
73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (7) (C) (Supp. I, 1959).
3. McLeod v. Chefs Union, 181 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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Section 8(b) (7) was added to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 4 The section makes
picketing for recognitional, organizational, or bargaining purposes by an
uncertified union an unfair labor practice if: (1) the employer has already
lawfully recognized another union in accordance with the act and a valid
question of representation cannot be raised under the act; (2) a valid election
has been held under section 9(c) 5 of the act within the past twelve months;
(3) an election petition under section 9(c) of the act has not been filed
within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days. The section
specifically stipulates that subsection (c) shall not be construed to prevent
picketing or other publicity aimed at advising the public that the employer does
not employ union members or have a union contract, unless such picketing
should induce employees of other employers not to service the picketed
employer.
The ruling of the United States Supreme Court in the Curtis Bros.0 case that
section 8(b)(1)(A) 7 did not apply to peaceful picketing, whether organiza-
tional or recognitional in nature, placed the regulation and control of peaceful
picketing solely within the ambit of Sections 8(b)(4)8 and 8(b)(7) of the
Taft-Hartley Act.
The latent ambiguities present in section 8(b) (7) (C) have been the source
of considerable speculation9 both in regard to the section's application by the
National Labor Relations Board and its eventual interpretation by the
courts.' 0 The instant case is the first appellate ruling on the section. Decisions
rendered by the lower courts in the new enactment's brief lifetime, however,
4. 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (Supp. I, 1959).
5. 61 Stat. 144 (1947) (amended by 73 Stat. 542, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(Supp. I, 1959)).
6. NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), affirming 274 F.2d 551 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), reversing 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957) (popularly known as Curtis Bros.). The
Curtis controversy, which arose prior to the enactment of § 8(b)(7)(C), revolved
around the question as to whether or not the words "to restrain or coerce" in §
8(b) (1) (A) could be interpreted to apply to peaceful picketing. The NLRB interpreted the
section as applying to peaceful picketing and entered a cease-and-desist order against
a picketing union. On review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set
aside the order, ruling that the section had no application to peaceful picketing, whether
"organizational or recognitional" in nature, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
7. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958), which provides in pertinent
part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--(1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 .... "
8. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. I, 1959). Section 8(b)(4) deals
primarily with the problem of "secondary boycotts" and is beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
9. See, e.g., Wyle, The New Law of Picketing, 10 Lab. L.J. 889 (1959) ; Symposium-The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959: Interpretations and Impli-
cations, 48 Geo. LJ. 205 (1959); Fanning, The New Taft-Hartley Amendments: A
Preliminary Look, 10 Lab. LJ. 763 (1959); Comment, Title VII of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 737, 767 (1960).
10. Sometimes, as in the instant case, the initial interpretation will be by the courts.
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created a background of conflicting interpretations. In Gctrcis v. Bartenders
Union,n the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
denied the Regional Director an injunction, holding that the section did not ban
recognitional picketing if done in conjunction with informational picketing. A
contrary conclusion was reached in three other cases where the district courts
granted temporary injunctions to restrain picketing intended both to gain
recognition and to publicize the fact that the company was nonunion. 1-
The battle lines were quickly drawn. The most noteworthy of the latter cases
was decided in the Eastern District of New York.13 In this decision, the picket-
ing was admittedly begun for recognitional purposes. Subsequently, upon the
advice of attorneys, changes were made in the picket signs in an apparent at-
tempt to bring the picketing within the prescriptions of the act. The district
court nevertheless granted a temporary injunction, holding that a mere unilateral
declaration of policy did not necessarily change the objective of the picheting.14
The circumstances of the instant case were quite similar. The unions
admittedly picketed for recognitional and bargaining purposes from 1957
until the charges were filed in January 1960. This period encompassed a two-
month period of admitted illegal activity under section 8(b) (7) (C). 15 Sub-
sequent to the filing of the charges, letters were sent to the Club and the
National Labor Relations Board, informing them that the unions "dccided to
cease picketing the Stork Restaurant, Inc. for the purpose of obtaining recogni-
tion and to withdraw their demand therefor."' 0' Changes were simultaneously
made in the picket signs. The United States district court granted the Regional
Director a temporary injunction, reasoning that inasmuch as the changed picket
signs stated that the Club did not have a contract with the labor unions, the
ultimate purpose of the picketing was to pressure the Club into recognizing
and bargaining with the unions.' The court also reiterated a prior ruling
that a unilateral declaration in policy will not necessarily change the purposes
of the picketing.' s
11. 181 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1960). Subsection (C) was comtrucd to mean
that "although 'an object' of picketing may be bargaining, as it admittedly is in this
case, it is immunized from the statute if 'the purpose' of such picketing is also truthfully
to inform the public that the employer does not have a contract with the union and
further if the picketing does not curtail picking up, delivery or transportation of goods
or the performance of services."
12. McLeod v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 431 (E.D N.Y. lq0);
Elliott %% Sapulpa Typographical Union, - F. Supp. - (45 L.R.M . 24nD) (N.D. da.
Dec. 9, 1959); Phillips v. ILGWU - F. Supp. - (45 L.R.R.M. 2363) (M.D. Tenn. Dec.
1s, 1959).
13. McLeod v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, supra note 12.
14. Id. at 4S6.
15. Section 8(b)(7) was passed on Sept. 14, 1959, and became effective on 'Nov. 13,
1959. 73 Stat. 546 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
16. 280 F.2d at 762 n.2.
17. McLeod v. Chefs Union, 1SI F. Supp. 742 (S.D.NA'. 1960).
18. Id. at 747, citing McLeod v. Local 239, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp,
4S1 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected both aspects of the
lower court's reasoning. The appellate court held that section 8(b) (7) (C)
specifically permitted the unions to inform the public that the employer did
not have a union contract, and therefore an illegal inference could not be
drawn from picket signs which purported to make use of that provision. The
district court's use of the unions' unlawful objectives prior to their change
in policy as an indication of the unions' intentions thereafter, was also held
error. Citing its own opinion in the Arnold Baker case, 19 the court reiterated
that it "rejected the application of a presumption of the continuity of a state
of affairs in construing the legality of picketing where there is no independent
evidence to support such a presumption. '20 In Arnold Baker, however, the
Board had spoken in terms of, and apparently did attempt to apply, such a
presumption.2 ' In the instant case, though, the district court considered the
unions' objectives prior to the filing of charges along with other evidence, and
reached its conclusion that the Board had reasonable cause to believe that an
unfair labor practice was taking place based upon an evaluation of all the
evidence, without expressly or impliedly referring to any presumption. The
distinction is worthy of note. In its role as an administrative fact-finding body,
the National Labor Relations Board has been permitted to scrutinize prior
union practices in determining subsequent union intent.22 In the past, the Board
has, in fact, been permitted to consider union activities prior to the enactment
of a labor act in evaluating subsequent union motives. 23 If the circuit court's
opinion can be interpreted to remove union activity prior to a declared change
in policy from serious consideration by the district court, a curious anomaly
could result. It is foreseeable that the Board will continue to consider prior
union objectives and activities when ultimately passing as a question of fact
on an unfair labor charge filed pursuant to section 8(b) (7) (C). Such evidence
undoubtedly will be of major importance in enabling the Board to reach its
finding. And yet, for all practical purposes, such evidence will be denied the
Board when attempting to prove before a district court that it has but
reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice is taking place.
While still admissible, such evidence would apparently be accorded little, if
any, weight by the court.
The circuit court upheld the temporary injunction based upon the second
proviso of section 8(b)(7)(C) which renders even informational picketing an
unfair labor practice if "an effect" thereof is "to induce" an employee of
19. NLRB v. Bakers Union, 245 F.2d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 1957) (popularly called the
Arnold Baker case).
20. 280 F.2d at 764.
21. Bakers Union, 115 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1336 (1956).
22. See, e.g., American Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 529 (1959) ; McCulloch Motors
Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1709 (1958); Consolidated -Chem. Indus., 120 NL.R.B.. 1625 (1958);
Coast Aluminum Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1326 (1958); News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210
(1956).
23. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 841, 847
(4th Cir. 1939); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., I N.L.R.B. 1, 7 (1935), enforced,
303 U.S. 261 (1938), reversing 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937).
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another employer not to render services to the picketed establishment. The
court felt the injunction was warranted under this clause, based upon the
testimony of three truck drivers who testified before the district court that
they refused to make deliveries to the Stork Club when they saw that it was
being picketed. The concurring opinion agreed with the results of the majority
decision. In construing the second proviso, however, the concurring opinion
suggested that the inducing of employees of other employers not to cro-s the
picket lines must be an intended result of the picketing. The majority opinion,
without expressly stating so, apparently looked only to the results of the
picketing, whether intended or not, in determining the legality of the informa-
tional picketing. The latter interpretation gains heavy support from the
legislative history of the section.2 4 The decision of the circuit court to modify
the injunction25 is an indication that the second proviso of section 3(b) (7) (C)
may receive a liberal application by the courts. In this instance, at least, the
refusal to deliver did not immediately render the informational picketing an
unfair labor practice in its entirety. This result, foreseen by some,, is discusszed
but rejected in the concurring opinion.
In the final analysis, the instant case provides few, if any, definite answers
to the complex questions raised by possible divergent interpretations of section
8(b) (7) (C). The case would, at least temporarily, resolve the aforementioned
conflict of interpretations in the district courts and reject the construction of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana that
recognitional picketing, if coupled with informational objectives, is not illegal
under section 8(b) (7) (C).2 s
24. The Senate Committees Analysis stated that informational piecting v.ould be
allowed "providing the effect of the picketing is not to induce a disruption of crviecc at
the employee's place of business' Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 36th Cong., Ist Sess., Section-by-Section analyzis of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Comm. Print 1959). The rcrnad1rl of
Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts also lend weight to this interpretation: "You can itart
picketing with anything you have, with any members you have; but if the picting
results in stopping deliveries or service employees from entcring the prcmic7, then there
must be an immediate election.' 105 Cong. Rec. lSSGO (daily ed. Aug, 2, 1959), The
Senator's remarks on September 3, 1959, are also pertinent: "When the picketing re uls
in economic pressure through the refusal of other employees to cro.s the picket line,
the bill would require a prompt election?' 105 Cong. Rcc. 16413 (daily cd. Sept. 3, 1959).
25. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination a3 to the houra
during which deliveries would be expected. After a hearing at which conflicting evidcre
was introduced by both parties, the court, by "balancing the equities of the partles,"
determined that picketing should not be carried on during the hours of 1 p.m, to 3 pm,,
or from 7 p.m. to S pan. McLeod v. Chefs Union, - F. Supp. - (46 L.R1MR . 2914)
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1960).
26. See, e.g., Dunau, A Preliminary Look at Section S(b)(7), 4S Gco. LJ. 371, 373
(1959).
27. Getreu v. Bartenders Union, 181 F. Supp. 733 (NJ). Ind. M .0).
23. Subsequent district court decisions have recognized that information, recognition,
or bargaining cannot be concurrent purposes or immediate objectives of the picketing.
However, these decisions modified this interpretation by rcfusing to grant injunctions
1960]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The case poses an additional problem for the NLRB. Just what the courts
will now construe as "substantial independent evidence" in ascertaining what are
grounds for "reasonable cause to believe" that an unfair labor practice is
taking place is not clear. However, until further elucidation is forthcoming, it
would appear that a union's announced change in policy is tantamount to a
self-administered general absolution removing all taint of prior union trans-
gressions. It would, therefore, be incumbent upon the NLRB, in order to obtain
injunctive relief to enforce its orders, to present evidence to the court that the
picketing for recognitional, organizational, or bargaining purposes was activated
or continued active after the "informational" campaign had begun.
Taxation-Application of Constructive Receipt Doctrine to Shares of
Stock and the Dividends Payable on Them.-Plaintiffs owned stock' in a
public utility holding company which was liquidating its assets in accordance
with a judicially confirmed reorganization plan.2 Under the reorganization plan
the plaintiffs could exchange their stock in the liquidating company for a new
common stock to be issued by its subsidiary company. 8 Instead of exchanging
even though the ultimate "hope" or purpose of the unions was recognition or bargaining.
These cases looked solely to the "immediate" rather than the ultimate purposes in
determining the legality of the picketing. Graham v. Retail Clerks Ass'n, 47 L.R.R.M. 2009
(D. Mont. Oct. 25, 1960); Penello v. Retail Store Employees Union, 46 L.R.R.M. 3021 (D.
Md. Sept. 23, 1960); Cavers v. Teamsters "General" Local 200, 46 L.R.R.M. 2829 (E.D.
Wis. Aug. 18, 1960); Greene v. International Typographical Union, 186 F. Supp. 630, (D.
Conn. 1960). In theory, these decisions agree with the interpretation of Stuart Rothman,
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, advanced in a speech made before
the Missouri State Bar Association, in which he stated that § 8(b) (7) (C) was intended to
allow picketing which had an immediate informational objective "albeit the hope of the
picketing union is that such tactics will carry it closer to ultimate recognition." News and
Background, 46 Lab. Rel. Rep. 449 (Oct. 10, 1960).
1. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, owned 3,633 shares of 7% cumulative prior preference
stock of Portland Electric Power Company, herein referred to as "Portland." These shares
were acquired during the years 1944-1946 at a cost of $140,031.
2. Petition of Portland Elec. Power Co., 162 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
837 (1947).
3. The reorganization plan provided that Portland General Electric Company (herein
referred to as "PGE"), a wholly owned operating subsidiary of Portland, was to reclassify
and increase its authorized common stock and to issue to Portland 998,996 58/60 shares
of such new common stock in exchange for the previously oustanding common stock held
by Portland. PGE was also to transfer to Portland a dividend of $1,600,000 in cash and
$93,000 principal amount in Portland's own bonds. Portland was then to distribute
cash and common stock of PGE to holders of Portland's bonds and prior preference and
first preferred stock in exchange for the Portland securities held by them. The holder of
each share of prior preference stock was to receive 63 shares of common stock of PGE.
Under the plan the holders of prior preference stock were given ten years after entry of
the final decree in the reorganization within which to exchange such prior preference stock
for common stock of PGE. At the end of ten years, whatever Portland stock bad not
[Vol. 29
their stock, the plaintiffs sold it and received in the sales price an additional
consideration which was attributable to the value of the dividends4 then pay-
able on the subsidiary stock. They reported the difference between the cost
of the stoc: and the sales price as long term capital gain. The Internal
Revenue Service contended that part of the sales price reported by plaintiffs
as long term capital gain was constructively received by plaintiffs as a dividend
and should have been reported as dividend income. Plaintiffs' taxable income
was adjusted accordingly and they paid a deficiency5 based on the adjustment.
The United States district court denied plaintiffs' claim for a refund. The court
of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting, and held that the constructive receipt
principle0 was applicable, and that the proceeds of the stock sale were txable
as ordinary income as to that part of the sales price which represented accrued
dividends on the subsidiary company's common stock. Brundage v. United
States, 275 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 4S (1960).
The doctrine of constructive receipt has been a part of Treasury Regulations
been exchanged would be valueless. The effective date of the reorganization p7an was
February 2, 1943. Brundage v. United States 275 F.2d 424, 425-26 (7th Cir,), ctrL
denied, 81 Sup. Ct. 4S (1960).
4. On July 7, 1947, the directors of PGE declared a special dividend of three dQVhr; per
share to be paid to the holders of the new common stock when, and if, such ctvc% should
be issued pursuant to the plan. Additional special dividends were declared in both Novcmber
and December of 1947, each of forty-five cents per share. In March and June of 194I,
further dividends of forty-five cents per share were declared, to be paid to holder3 of the
common stock of PGE. With respect to those Portland shares which were outstanding,
the proper dividends were set aside until such time as the exchange should be made for
PGE common stock. Id. at 426.
5. I.e., $39,076.12, plus $7,731.07 in interest. Id. at 425.
6. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-2 (1939), v:hich provides: "Income not rcducA to
possession.-Income which is credited to the account of or set apart for a tx"payer
and which may be drawn upon by him at any time is subject to tax for the ycr during
which so credited or set apart, although not then actually reduced to po-ssesion. To cmnsti-
tute receipt in such a case the income must be credited or set apart to the taxpayer with-
out any substantial limitation or restricion as to the time or manner of parm.nt or
condition upon which payment is to be made, and must be made available to him !:t that
it may be drawn at any time, and its receipt brought within his own control and dLpQ:i-
tion. . . ." Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-3 (1939), provides: 'E.xamplcz of constructive r¢czcpL
-If interest coupons have matured and are payable, but have not ben casheJ, such
interest, though not collected when due and payable, shall be included in grcss income for
the year during which the coupons mature, unless it can be shown that there are no funds
available for payment of the interest during such year. The interest !hall be included in
gross income even though the coupons are exchanged for other property intead of
eventually being cashed. The amount of defaulted coupons is income for the year in
which paid. Dividends on corporate stock are subject to tax when unqualifiedly made
subject to the demand of the shareholder. If a dividend is declared payable on Dt.cmber
31 and the corporation intended to and did follow its practice of paying the dividends
by checks mailed so that the shareholders would not receive them until January of the
following year, such dividends are not considered to have been unqualificlly made
subject to the demand of the shareholders prior to January, when the checdu were
actually received. .. '
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since 1918. 7 It was conceived as a preventive measure which would eliminate
the avoidance and possible evasion of income taxes by taxpayers who, at that
time, could choose the year in which to report income by choosing the year
in which to reduce it to possession. 8 The doctrine, although not spelled out
expressly in the Internal Revenue Code, has been a familiar concept in
Treasury Regulations and has been accorded the force of law.9 The basic
principle of the doctrine is that income subject to the unfettered command of
a taxpayer, which he is free to enjoy at his own option, may be taxed to him
as his income, whether or not he sees fit to enjoy it.10 Although originally
designed as a tool to be used by the Commissioner, the doctrine has recently
been recognized as an aid which may be relied on to benefit the taxpayer as
well.11
The application of the constructive receipt doctrine has been wide and
varied. 12 Typical items to which the doctrine has been applied are salary
credited in a given year but not withdrawn by the employee,13 interest on bank
deposits1 4 and bond coupons which are payable but not collected. 18 Tax-
ability turns on whether the income is subject to the taxpayer's unhampered
7. Treas. Reg. 45, § 213 (1918).
8. Weil v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949);
Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948). The doctrine mitigates the require-
ment that income must be actually received to be taxable. By complementing the actual
receipt doctrine with the doctrine of constructive receipt, it is no longer possible for the
taxpayer to take advantage of the shifting scale of tax rates by reporting deferred income
in a poor year.
9. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1945); Helvering v. Winmill, 30
U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
10. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
11. Weil v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 805, 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949);
Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 491-92 (1st Cir. 1948). The Ross decision presents
the taxpayer with an opportunity to avoid taxes by allowing him the use of the construc-
tive receipt doctrine as a defense by asserting that present income was constructively
received and therefore is taxable only in years which are now barred by limitations, Mr.
justice Frankfurter recognized this possibility, but stated in his opinion that he did not
consider that this holding would result in any increase in tax violation because the Govern-
ment had the ability to collect taxes at any time in the event of fraudulent evasion. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 276(a), 53 Stat. 87 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(c)).
For an early approach to taxpayers' use of constructive receipt doctrine as a defense, see
Bailey v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1939).
12. Por a general discussion of the concept and applications of the doctrine, see
Comment, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 77 (1950); 3 CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. U1 2834; 2
Mertens, Federal Income Taxation §§ 10.01 to .18 (Zimet & Stanley rev. 1955), 2 RIA
Federal Tax Coordinator F-1103; Kutz, Constructive Receipt Re-examined, N.Y.U.
12th Inst. on Fed. Tax 497 (1954).
13. Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1930).
14. Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 38 B.TA. 960 (1938), appeal dismissed mem., 106 F.2d
999 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 672 (1940).
15. Loose v. United States, 74 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934).
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control.' 0 The doctrine is properly applied when the party in control can
designate another as beneficiary merely to satisfy a donative impulse.17 But
where complete control over a share of the income from a trust is assigned for
life, the doctrine does not apply and the donee is taxable on the income.",
The principle of constructive receipt has been applied to dividend income to
make it taxable before it is actually received, where such dividend income is
made unqualifiedly subject to the demand of the shareholder.Y9 This has been
true even where the corporation declaring the dividend did not have sufficient
cash on hand to pay the dividend declared.20 Dividends have been held to be
constructively received when a dividend check was received but not cashed - '
and where such checks were deposited by the shareholders in their rezpective
accounts but the amounts of the checks were subsequently returned to the
corporation.2 2 It is possible for dividends to be constructively received before
they are payable -3 and even before they are declared-" as dividends. It has
been held that earnings not yet declared as dividends, but nonetheless credited
to shareholders, are constructive dividends and are taxable as such when they
are made unqualifiedly subject to the demand of the stockholders.2-
In the instant case, the plaintiffs were vested through the reorganization plan
with rights to the shares of the subsidiary corporation. As equitable ovners of
the subsidiary's shares, the plaintiffs had a right to the dividends payable on
those shares. The parent corporation's shares, which were of little or no value
in and of themselves, acquired a new value as the means of evidencing the
right to the subsidiary's shares and to the dividends accrued on the latter.
The court reasoned that the sale of the parent's stock carried with it the
right to collect the dividends which were payable on the subsidiary's shares.
The value of the dividend rights was part of the consideration which the
plaintiffs received for the parent's shares. For tax purposes, the amount of
the subsidiary's dividends was constructively received by the plaintiffs and they
were accountable for the dividends as ordinary income. The court, stating that
the dominant purpose of revenue laws is the taxation of income to thoze who
16. See, e.g., Helvering v. Ran-in, 295 U.S. 123 (1935); Weil v. Commirzincr, 173
F.2d S05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 33S U.S. 321 (1949).
17. HarrLson v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
13. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
19. See International Bedaux Co. v. Commisioncr, 204 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 19.3);
Bennett v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 961 (Sth Cir. 1944); A.D. Sangcr, Inc. v. CommkLionr,
84 F.2d 23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 577 (1936); Baker v. United Statcw, 17 F.
Supp. 976 (CL Cl. 1937).
20. A. D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 19; Baker v. United Statci, upra
note 19.
21. J. Arthur Currey, P-H Tax. Ct. Aem. 353 (1941).
22. Edgar M. Soreng, 4 T.C. S70, aff'd, 153 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1946).
23. Leon S. Herbert, 32 B.T.A. 372, aff'd, S1 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1936); Pattcrzon v.
Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
24. I.T. 1S72, 11-2 Cum. Bull. Z0 (1923).
25. Hadley v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Chattanooga Say. Bank
v% Brewer, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 751 (1927).
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enjoy the benefits of it when paid,20 found that the character of the dividends
would not be changed from ordinary income to capital gains income because
they were received as part of a sales price of a capital asset. 27
In his dissent, Judge Major argued that the plaintiffs merely had an option
to exchange their stock for the new common stock of the subsidiary. The
dissenting opinion reasoned that since the plaintiffs could not collect the
dividends on the subsidiary's shares until they exchanged the shares of the
parent company, they did not have an unfettered right to the dividends.
As the dissent pointed out, the instant case is unique because one con-
structive receipt was imposed upon another2 But the fact that it is un-
26. 275 F.2d at 427, citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940), and Fisher
v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513, 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1014 (1954).
27. 275 F.2d at 427, citing United States v. Snow, 223 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 831 (1955): "The general rule is that a right to receive ordinary income, pro-
duced by a capital asset, is not transmuted into a capital asset by the sale or assignment
of the capital asset together with the right to receive the ordinary income . . ." 223 F.2d
at 108. The court here is referring to the contention of the Government that the instant
case falls within the scope of the provisions of Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.42-3 (1939), to the
effect that items constructively received shall be included in gross income even though ex-
changed for other property. Here the dividends were sold to the purchaser along with the
stock, and it is well settled that a taxpayer cannot shift the incidence of income tax nor con-
vert ordinary income into capital gain by the simple expedient of assigning and transferring
the right to such income. In support of their position, the defendants cited in their brief
Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S.
122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S.
136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F,2d 901 (7th CIr.
1956). Brief for Appellee, p. 11.
In its discussion of the plaintiff's argument, the court dismissed the contention of the
taxpayers that even if they had actually received the declared PGE dividends, such pay-
ments would have given rise to capital gain as cash received in liquidation of Portland.
The court relied on the provisions of the reorganization plan to show that no provision
was made for the dividends to be liquidating distributions. As a result, Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 115 (c) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 331), does not apply. This section provides:
"Distributions in liquidation. Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corpo-
ration shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock. .. ."
28. judge Major further states that the application of the constructive receipt doctrine
to cases similar to the instant case could produce the incongruous result of numerous
taxpayers being held accountable for the same dividends. This would be so if the Portland
shares were sold many times before being exchanged for the PGE shares and dividends.
It is admitted that more than one person could conceivably be taxed on PGE dividends
before the Portland stock was exchanged for the PGE shares, but it would not follow
that more than one person would be taxed on the same dividends on PGE shares. This
is so because the dividends are income only to the one who owns the shares at the time the
dividends are payable. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9 (now Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 61). The dividends would be taxable to that owner whether or not he col-
lected them. And, if he transferred the stock with the dividends still uncollected, the trans-
feree would merely receive an extra value with the shares. As to the transferee, the dividends
would not be ordinary income, since it is property sold or exchanged, falling within the
definition of capital asset in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
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usual does not make the application of the doctrine any less correct or just.
There is no question that the plaintiffs, as holders of the stock in the parent
corporation, had a right to the income represented by the dividends on the
shares in the subsidiary corporation. It was on the issue of whether or not
this was an unqualified right that the majority and dissent disa7geed. The
dissent reasoned that the necessity for an exchange of the parent corporation
shares for the subsidiary corporation shares precluded the existence of any
unqualified right to the income. But this position, however correct as a matter
of corporate law, is not consistent with principles of taxation. It is submitted
that the constructive receipt doctrine applies where the actual possession of
the income can be obtained by some action which is of no detriment to the
taxpayer, and which of itself has no effect on the production of the income. -3
Since the action required of the taxpayers was a simple exchange of their
stock, the holding of the majority that the income was unqualifiedly subject to
the taxpayers' command was dearly correct.
The plaintiffs received their unqualified right to the subsidiary's shares from
the provisions of the reorganization plan. This right carried with it an
unqualified right to the dividends accrued on the shares. Since the right to the
new common stock of the subsidiary belonged to the plaintiffs at the time that
the declared dividends became pal-able, the plaintiffs were accountable for
those dividends as ordinary income, regardless of how the dividends were
eventually received. One who has an unqualified right to an income-producing
asset is properly taxable on the income produced by that asset. 0
29. See, e.g., Loose v. United States, 74 F.2d 147 (Sth Cir. 1934). Income from maturcd
bonds was held to have been constructively received even though the ovncr of the coupons
was unable to cash them. "[T]he strongest reason for holding constructive rccdpt of
income to be within the statute is that for taxation purposz3 income is rceivcd or
realized when it is made subject to the will and control of the taxpayer and can be,
except for his own action or inaction, reduced to actual pos-:ec=ion." Id. at 150. Sce olzo
Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 329 U.S. 719 (1946).
30. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The court, in the instant case, points out
that the plaintiffs received the value of the dividends in the -alcs price of thcir Portland
stock. It almost appears from the court's remarks that the rccdving of the sales price
along with the added value is what makes the constructive recdpt doctrine applicable.
Of course, this is not so. It is the unqualified command over income which is controlling, c-o
that the doctrine may be applied regardless of whether the income is r,duccd to p zz on
in any way. An interesting and unusual situation could have arizen had the parties taken
no action until the right to exchange the shares had lap-cd. It would sem thnt the
Government might bring an action for taxes on dividends constructively received during the
ten year period, although never collected, and at the same time the taxpayer would no
longer be able to collect the income for which he was taxed.
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